COMMENTS
The Secured Creditor's Right to Full Liquidation
Value in Corporate Reorganization
A corporation forced by business failure into a state of legal
insolvency or inability to pay its debts as they mature may petition
the federal bankruptcy court to enforce a plan of reorganization, or
may be brought into the court by a petition filed by its major creditors, under chapter X 1 or section 772 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
Corporate reorganizations, which readjust the debt and equity obligations of the insolvent corporation, essentially provide a substitute
for a forced liquidation sale of the debtor corporation. 3 It may be
difficult or impossible to sell a large bankrupt enterprise intact, and
a sale in lot or bulk at spot market prices, especially in hard times,
is likely to bring disastrously little for distribution among creditors
and other claimants. 4 In order to preserve the business as an operating entity until business fortunes improve, and to salvage "going
concern" value, the spot market is bypassed. A fictional reorganization value is computed, which is said to represent the fair or intrinsic value of the business, and investors are compensated for their
claims in securities of the reorganized enterprise.5
Reorganization is primarily beneficial to junior creditors and
equity interests, since they are protected from the adverse consequences of a forced sale at market prices.6 At the same time, however, the reorganization process is geared to the protection of senior
and secured creditors.' Although the secured creditor is denied his
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970) (corporate reorganizations). Three or more creditors with
an aggregate liquidated claim of at least $5,000 may file a petition if the corporation has been
adjudged bankrupt or has committed an act of bankruptcy or if all or most of its property is
held by a receiver or by an indenture trustee or mortgagee after default or is subject to a
pending foreclosure proceeding. Id. §§ 526, 531.
2 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) (railroad reorganizations).
' See Blum, The Law and Language of CorporateReorganization,17 U. Cm. L. REV. 565,
566 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Reorganization]; Blum, Full Priority and Full
Compensation in Corporate Reorganizations: A Reappraisal,25 U. Cm. L. REv. 417, 419
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Full Compensation]; Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate Reorganization and the Secured Creditor's Rights of Reclamation, 123 U. PA. L. Rv.
509 (1975).
CorporateReorganization, supra note 3, at 566-67.
See generally Full Compensation, supra note 3.
8 Corporate Reorganization,supra note 3, at 566.
In this comment, "secured creditor" will refer to a lender, seller, or other person in
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contractual right to a foreclosure sale upon the debtor corporation's
default, if the reorganization is successful, he will receive in securities of the reorganized business the equitable equivalent of the value
of the lien or claim surrendered.' The absolute priority doctrine,
which was enunciated by the Supreme Court prior to the modern
bankruptcy statutes,9 and which governs today,"0 insures further
that the adjustment process results in participation by junior security holders in the reorganized enterprise only after seniors have
been fully compensated."
Moreover, although the reorganization process is designed to
avoid the consequences of a liquidation sale, the value of a lien is
broadly defined by the contractual right of a secured creditor to
foreclose upon the debtor's default. The bankruptcy courts, being
subject to the fifth amendment proscription against the taking of
private property "for public use, without just compensation," must
preserve not only the priority of the senior creditors, but also the
property interests represented by the liens.12 A secured creditor in
reorganization, then, is entitled to receive the value obtainable
foreclosure proceedings, a value
through ordinary bankruptcy
3
known as liquidation value.
whose favor there is a security interest. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§.9-105(m), 9-301 (3).
See Full Compensation, supra note 3, at 421, quoting Group of Institutional Investors
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943).
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
,2Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); see, e.g., In re Spectrum Arena, Inc., 340 F. Supp.
767, 779-80 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
11.06 (14th ed. 1972). The absolute priority doctrine
" See 6A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
only states a rule of priority for the allocation of the value of an enterprise among competing
claimants. It does not directly determine the minimum amount of compensation to which a
secured creditor is constitutionally entitled in a reorganization, which is the subject of this

comment. See text and notes at notes 13-14 infra; cf. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 at
254, 258-59 (1973) (suggesting that value in excess of liquidation value should not be distributed under a strict priority rule). But see Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute PriorityDoctrine in
Corporate Reorganizations,41 U. CHI. L. REv. 651 (1974). See also Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
540 (1970).
,2A lien has been held to be "property" within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935). In a similar context, the mortgagee is entitled in eminent
domain proceedings to have the mortgage debt satisfied in full from the proceeds of the
condemnation award before other parties with interests may participate. 2 P. NICHOLS, THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.741, at 5-203 (rev. 3d ed. 1974).
,3Cf. Fleischmann & Devine, Inc. v. Saul Wolfson Dry Goods Co., 299 F. 15 (1st Cir.
1924); In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 92 S.E.C. 416 (1941).
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In most successful reorganizations, senior security holders will
be fully compensated for the value of their claims under the absolute priority doctrine. But in cases in which the value of the reorganized corporation (or, if the reorganization fails, of the laterliquidated property) declines during the pendency of the proceedings to such an extent that the secured creditors' liquidation value
is not fully compensated for, an unconstitutional taking of their
property occurs. This long-recognized ultimate limit on the power
of the reorganization court has been reaffirmed in general by the
Bankruptcy Commission in its proposed new Bankruptcy Act."
Nevertheless, courts supervising the bankruptcy reorganization
process have in recent years taken an increasingly expansive view
of their powers and have evidenced increasing disregard of the immutable right of a secured creditor to the liquidation value of his
lien. One knowledgeable commentator has observed, on the basis of
both reported and unreported court orders, that courts deliberately
delay hearings in order to give a distressed debtor more time in
"disputes whose resolution is potentially disastrous for the debtor,"
and sometimes even render decisions that "are almost certain of
reversal but which serve a useful protective purpose in the meantime."15 In 1970, the Supreme Court gave impetus to this trend by
its statement in the New Haven Inclusion Cases 6 that secured creditors who invested in a railroad or public utility had "assumed the
risk that in any. . . reorganization the interests of the public would
Liquidation value, in general, refers to the highest price that could be realized, whether
by bulk or lot bidding, at a foreclosure sale. Cf. In re Winthrop Mills, 109 F. Supp. 323 (D.
Me. 1952). In the case of a large multistate corporation, troublesome issues may be encountered in calculating a hypothetical liquidation value, as attested by the litigation that reached
the Supreme Court in the New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970). However, the
concept of liquidation value as the amount that would have been realized through an actual
foreclosure and sale commenced as of the date specified was not questioned. Although the
issue was not decided in New Haven, see 399 U.S. at 459-67, the concept of liquidation value
in the case of an interstate railroad probably should include an allowance for the time
required to obtain a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" for abandonment which
is required by section 77(o) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(o) (1970), and section
1(18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (18) (1970); cf. In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 922 (Spec. Ct. 1974), motion for leave to file petition for writ of
certiorariand/ormandamus and/orprohibitiondenied, 420 U.S. 922 (1975).
14 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 258-59;
pt. 2, at 237 (note to proposed section 7-203).
,5 Festersen, Equitable Powers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation:Protection of the Debtor
and the Doomsday Principle, 46 AM. BANKR. L. J. 311, 329 (1972). Festersen has also observed
that "[tihe courts are becoming more . . . disposed to exercise their discretionary powers
in favor of debtors and, accordingly, more forthright about doing so." Id. at 317.
Is 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
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be considered as well as theirs.'

7 The

case has been viewed by some

as having changed the law
applicable to railroad and corporate re8
organizations in general.1

The theme of this comment is that the law has not been
changed and that it should not be changed by the courts. The first
part of the comment will examine the development of protections
for secured creditors' property interests under the modern reorganization statutes. The second part will argue that the New Haven
decision did not change these basic rules. Finally, the policies behind protection of secured creditors and the purposes of the reorganization statutes will be briefly reviewed in order to indicate how
fundamentally the corporate reorganization process would be altered by a rule that failed to preserve the liquidation value of secured creditors' liens adequately during the pendency of reorganization proceedings.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF SECURED
CREDITORS IN REORGANIZATION

A.

Judicial Definition of the Scope of Secured Creditors' Protected
Rights: Liquidation Value

In ContinentalIllinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.,' 9 the Supreme Court considered
an appeal from an injunction restraining the sale of bonds held by
creditors as security for notes of the debtor railroad. The bondholders argued that if the railroad reorganization statute sanctioned the
injunction, it violated the fifth amendment by depriving them of
their right to sell the pledged collateral upon default.20 But the debt
obligations were well secured; the face amount of the collateral was
three times greater than the debt,2 ' and unless a drastic change in
circumstances were to have occured, the lien could not have been
impaired by the injunction.2 2 In addition, the lower court had found
that sale of the collateral would prevent the formulation and con"7
Id. at 492, quoting Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S.
495, 535-36 (1946).
'1See Note, Takings and the PublicInterest in RailroadReorganization, 82 YALE L. J.
1004 (1973) [hereinafter cited as YALE NOTE]; Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The
Secured Creditor in Reorganization and Arrangement Proceedings,30 Bus. LAW. 15, 16 & n.9
(1974).
" 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
Id. at 651-52.
21 Id. at 658-59.
Id. at 681.
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summation of a plan of reorganization.? On these facts, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order enjoining foreclosure
24
on the lien interest.
The decision in Continental Bank is consistent with earlier
Supreme Court opinions invalidating injunctions that stayed liquidation of unprofitable enterprises. In Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission,2 a state commission sought to compel a corporation to continue operating an unprofitable logging railroad at a loss.
Justice Holmes, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that even
if the corporation could be taken as having "granted to the public
an interest in the use of the railroad," it could "withdraw its grant
by discontinuing the use when that use can be kept up only at a
loss. 12 This rule has been recognized as limiting modem federal
bankruptcy statutes as well.Y
Taken together, the result of ContinentalBank and the rule of
Brooks-Scanlon define the outer limits of secured creditor rights of
foreclosure when the debtor is in reorganization. The creditor's foreclosure remedy may be suspended in the interest of reorganizing the
debtor's financial structure when, as in Continental Bank, there is
no danger to his lien interest. But it would be confiscatory within
the meaning of the fifth amendment to prevent withdrawal of capital through foreclosure if continued operation only imposed a loss
"

See id. at 678.
4 The possibility of lien impairment was quite remote in ContinentalBank itself, but
the Court addressed the question of impairment to secured creditors' interests generally,
stating that "[a] claim that injurious consequences will result to the pledgee or the mortgagee may not, of course, be disregarded . . . but it presents a question addressed not to the
power of the court but to its discretion." Id. at 677. Unfortunately, this language has led some
courts to misstate the holding in Continental Bank, so as to permit a stay of foreclosure
without regard to the security position of the creditor. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 933 (Spec. Ct. 1974), motion for leave to file petition for writ of
certiorariand/or mandamus and/or prohibition denied, 420 U.S. 922 (1975) (emphasizing
likelihood of reorganization and thus overlooking consequences if reorganization should fail
and liquidation ensue); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9, 12 (3d Cir. 1972). For a
more correct reading of Continental Bank, see In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270,
279 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). Other courts have stated the view, consistent
with ContinentalBank but beyond its particular facts, that if a secured creditor is harmed
by a stay of foreclosure he would have a claim for compensation. See In re New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 147 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 884 (1945).
- 251 U.S. 396 (1920). See also Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79
(1924); Bullock v. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U.S. 513 (1921).
2S 251 U.S. at 399.
2' Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 122 (1974); In re Penn. Cent.
Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 918-19 (Spec. Ct. 1974), motion for leave to file petitionfor
writ of certiorari and/or mandamus and/or prohibition denied, 420 U.S. 922 (1975). See
generally YALE NoTE, supra note 18, at 1008-10.
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on the creditor, as indicated by Brooks-Scanlon." ContinentalBank
does not precisely define the property right of a secured creditor that
is protected by the fifth amendment, since its holding was only that
an injunction that "in no way impairs the lien" is not unconstitutional. Other Supreme Court decisions, however, have considered
more directly the kind of impairment that may constitute sufficient
confiscation.
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford29 and in Wright
v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank,3 the Supreme Court
recognized that the property right in a lien, for purposes of rehabilitation and reorganization proceedings, is its liquidation value at the
inception of the reorganization proceedings.31 The Court ruled that
the fifth amendment requires the protection of this value against
erosion during the rehabilitation proceeding.3 2 Although these cases
involved specialized rehabilitation statutes applying to bankrupt
farmers, the courts have3 recognized them as applicable to corporate
reorganizations as well.

In Radford, the constitutionality of the original Frazier-Lemke
Act 34 was decided. The Act, passed by Congress during the Depression, provided alternatives to the foreclosure sale of mortgaged farm
property for bankrupt farmers whose creditors would not agree to
composition under the Bankruptcy Act. The bankrupt farmer was
given the option of purchasing all or any part of the property at its
then appraised value by making deferred installment payments over
a period of six years, the deferred payments accumulating interest
2 But difficult problems of proof are pointed up in this regard by the government's
argument in the Regional Rail ReorganizationAct Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), that compelled
continued operation of the Penn Central at a loss according to an income statement did not
necessarily erode the security interests of secured creditors because there were offsetting
increases in the value of other assets. Brief for United States as Appellants at 59-73. Contra,
Brief for Appellees Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., at 44-47.
295 U.S. 555 (1935).
- 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
" See text and notes at notes 39-44, 51-56 infra. The liquidation value of the lien is
defined at note 13 supra. But see Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 521 n.43.
12 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-97 (1935).
" See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 154 (1974) quoting
Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 275 (1940), another Frazier-Lemke Act case, as
describing a standard for protection of secured creditors applicable in railroad
reorganizations; In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 278 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1974); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9, 13 n.10 (3d Cir. 1972) citing the
Radford and Mountain Trust Bank cases as applicable in chapter X proceedings. See also
YALE NOTE, supranote 18, at 1012: "In Radford the Supreme Court clearly interred any notion
that bankruptcy proceedings may strip creditors of the right ultimately to receive the value
of their collateral." But see Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 520-22.
31 Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 869, § 1, 48 Stat. 1289-91.
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at the annual rate of one percent. If the mortgagee refused to consent to the installment purchase plan, the bankrupt could require
the bankruptcy court to stay all proceedings for five years, during
which time he would remain in possession, under court supervision,
provided only that he pay an annual reasonable rental to be distributed among the creditors. At any time during the five-year period,
the bankrupt could discharge the debt by paying into court the
original appraised value of the property, or its subsequently reappraised value if the secured creditor had demanded a reappraisal. 5
The Court held that the Act violated the fifth amendment, stating
that the statutory scheme resulted in "the taking of substantive
'30
rights in specific property.
The Court first found the installment purchase alternative
objectionable because it would "not confer upon the mortgagee the
ordinary fruits of an immediate sale. '37 The bankrupt's promise to
pay was a mere unsecured personal obligation, and there was also
danger that the property might be less valuable to the mortgagee
because of waste and the accumulation of unpaid senior claims such
as taxes.3 8 Further, since interest on the deferred installment payments accumulated at only one percent annually, which was significantly less than the market rate, the sale would not be, in economic
reality, at the appraised value. 9
The alternative provided by the Act if the mortgagee did not
consent to the installment purchase option was also found unconstitutional. 4 5 One defect was the scheme's failure to guarantee that
taxes and insurance would be paid during the period of up to five
years during which the bankrupt would retain possession.,1 Of
greater importance was the suspension of the mortgagee's right to
sell to another buyer at a favorable price during the period of possession, combined with the right of the debtor to purchase the farm at
a reappraised price,4 2 even if it was less than the originally appraised
value.
The opinion listed five specific property rights that the FrazierLemke Act took from the mortgagee, 43 including the right to collect
1 This was the construction accepted by the Court. See Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 593 n.23 (1935).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 591-92.
"Id.

Id. at 592-93.
"

Id. at 593.

Id. Only the mortgagee could request reappraisal under this version of the Act.
The Court found the following rights under applicable state law:
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his debt through judicial sale and the right to determine when such
sale would be held. Thus, the fundamental objection to the Act was
that the equivalent of the position available to the mortgagee
through bankruptcy foreclosure proceedings was not preserved to
him in the Frazier-Lemke Act rehabilitation process. The procedures under the Act were unconstitutional because bankruptcy liquidation value was potentially diminished by the uncompensated
accumulation of senior claims, depreciation in the value of the collateral, and deprivation of the use value of capital."

In the Mountain Trust Bank" case, the Supreme Court held the
second Frazier-Lemke Act" constitutional. The new Act eliminated
1. The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid.
2. The right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale.
3. The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only to the discretion of the court.
4. The right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale ....
5. The right to control meanwhile the property during the period of default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected
by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.
Id. at 594-95.
" The Frazier-Lemke Act required the payment of rental while the bankrupt farmer
remained in possession of the property after the mortgagee refused to consent to an installment sale. Since market rental would include compensation for the use value of capital, the
Act effectively required the payment of interest on the capital invested by the mortgagee and
frozen by the stay on foreclosure. The payment of such interest would be essential to the
validity of any statutory deferral of foreclosure rights, as is strongly suggested by the Court's
criticism of the Act's installment purchase option on the ground that it provided for the
accumulation of interest at a rate below the market rate. Id. at 591-92. Similarly, the payment
of rental, including an interest component, was essential to the Supreme Court's decision that
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, which stayed foreclosure and extended the period
of redemption during the Depression was constitutional. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934). Requiring the payment of post-petition interest preserves the
full liquidation value of the secured creditor's lien by compensating him for alternative uses
of capital foregone after the inception of the proceeding during which foreclosure is stayed.
The rule in eminent domain also is that interest runs from the date of the condemnation until
the award is actually paid, and this is described as a matter of strict constitutional right. See
3 P. NICHOLS, supra note 12, at § 8.63.
In reorganization, however, the rule seems to be that interest accrues on secured claims
during the pendency of the proceedings only if the value of the collateral exceeds the unpaid
balance of the debt, if the collateral produces income, or if the estate proves sufficient to cover
accumulated interest. In re Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9, 16 (3d Cir. 1972); 3A W.
COLLIER, supra note 11,
63.16; 6A W. COLLIER, id., 9.08, at 201; Blum & Kaplan, supra
note 11, at 682. This rule is consistent with the concept of reorganization as a delayed
substitute for liquidation, but is arguably inconsistent with the Radford rule in failing to
recognize that a secured creditor's property right in a lien is measured by the full value of
the right to commence foreclosure proceedings at the inception of the reorganization, including interest that could be earned on the capital in alternative uses. The Radford and Blaisdell
decisions did not consider or rest upon whether the collateral produced income or whether
its value exceeded the amount of the indebtedness.
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1935).
" Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, § 6, 49 Stat. 943-45.
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the installment purchase option, reduced the maximum stay of proceedings from five years to three, and required a semi-annual payment of rent based on "rental value, net income, and earning capacity of the property" during the period of possession, which was to
be used first for taxes and upkeep. 47 The bankruptcy court was given
discretion to order interim payments on the principal and sale of
nonexempt property. 8 Finally, the bankrupt farmer as well as the
creditor was given the option of demanding reappraisal of the property, after which he could satisfy the debt by paying the reappraised
49
value.
The main attack on the amended statute was that the secured
creditor's right "to determine when a . . . [judicial] sale [was to]
be held, subject only to the discretion of the court"50 was effectively
denied by the three-year stay." But the Court construed the new Act
as granting the debtor only a limited right to possession by implic2
itly empowering the supervising court to order an earlier sale. If it
became apparent, for example, that the debtor could not refinance
himself within the three-year period, the court could exercise its
"broad power to curtail the stay for the protection of the mortgagee." '5 3 In addition, semi-annual rental payments were required and
could be supplemented by payments on the principal if, in the
court's discretion,
it was deemed necessary to "protect the creditors
5' 4
from loss.
As thus construed, the Act provided a high degree of protection
for the mortgagee's liquidation value." The Court emphasized
throughout its opinion in MountainTrust Bank that the supervising
court in a Frazier-Lemke Act proceeding had broad discretionary
power, essential to the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Act was
constitutional, to prevent the impairment of the mortgagee's lien by
any loss in the value of the security.56 As a matter of doctrine, then,
47Id., 49 Stat. 944.
49Id.
49

Id.

10300 U.S. at 460. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594
(1935).
300 U.S. at 460.
12Id. at 464 & n.9.
Id. at 464.
" Id. at 461.
In Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940), the Court, while considering another aspect of Frazier-Lemke Act proceedings, noted that the Act provided safeguards
"to protect the rights of secured creditors, throughout the proceedings, to the extent of the
value of the property." Id. at 278.
" See 300 U.S. at 458 n.2, 461-62, 464. The Court found a "careful intention to leave the
"1
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the Court reaffirmed Radford in requiring protection of liquidation
value.57 This proposition-that a secured creditor is constitutionally
entitled to the liquidation value of his collateral-has never been
abandoned by the Supreme Court58 and has been a fundamental
referent for congressional advisers59 and for leading commentators."
B.

Preserving Liquidation Value During Reorganization

The financial needs of a corporate debtor are often great and
the reorganization court is given broad powers to meet those needs
in the interest of successful reorganization. 1 The court has power to
stay all enforcement of liens, whether by foreclosure or self-help. 2
In order to obtain operating funds, the court may authorize issuance
of trustee certificates having priority over existing secured and nonsecured obligations. 3 It may use cash collateral derived from the
sale of property that is the subject of a lien, 4 and may order turnover of such cash proceeds if they are in the hands of indenture
trustees.6 5But the question of an unconstitutional taking of property
lien wholly unimpaired" underlying Congress's amendments to the original Act. Id. at 458
n.2.
. The opinion contains ambiguous language that might be taken as permitting some
impairment of the lien: "[The question] is whether the legislation modifies the secured
creditor's rights, remedial or substantive, to such an extent as to deny the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. A court of bankruptcy may affect the interests of lien
holders in many ways. . . ." Id. at 470. But the examples cited by the Court to illustrate
permissible modification of lien interests indicate that liquidation value must still be preserved. The first is the power of a bankruptcy court to marshall liens and to transfer the rights
of lien holders from collateral to proceeds after the collateral is sold. Id. But it is firmly
established that such power may not be exercised to the prejudice of the senior mortgage. G.
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 286 (2d ed. 1970); see Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 584 (1935); Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152
F.2d. 300, 308 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946). The other example given is
the power to enjoin the sale of collateral in a reorganization proceeding, but the cited authority, Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935),
itself dealt with a situation for which the lien was fully protected by the excess value of the
collateral. See text and notes at notes 19-22 supra.
See text and notes at notes 92-104 infra.
5'"A benchmark in determining the adequacy of protection is the liquidation value of
the collateral at the date of the petition." REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANsmUPTcv LAWS,
supra note 11, pt. 2, at 237.
See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 524-25; Trost, supra note 11, at 550-51.
See generally 6 W. COLLIER, supra note 11,
3.03, 3.05, 3.09, 3.10; Note, Interim
FinancingThrough Use of the Turnover Power in RailroadReorganizations,71 YALE L.J. 1553
(1962).
62 Bankruptcy Act § 113, 11 U.S.C. § 513 (1970). A complete discussion of a chapter X
court's power to stay execution of liens is found in Murphy, supra note 18, at 29-32.
Bankruptcy Act § 116(2), 11 U.S.C. § 516(2) (1970).
s Id. § 77, 11 U.S.C. § 205(o) (1970).
Id. § 257, 11 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
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may arise in the exercise of these powers if the security position of
creditors is thereby diminished. The courts, however, have developed two tests designed to insure that secured creditors' property
rights in the liquidation value of their liens are protected against
being taken in violation of the fifth amendment.
In In re Third Ave. Transit Corp. 11 the Second Circuit considered a petition by trustees of a bankrupt bus and trolley company
to use proceeds from the sale of mortgaged properties, in the hands
of the indenture trustee pursuant to contract, to meet the working
capital or operating needs of the business. In reversing approval of
the petition by the lower court, Judge Frank stated rules intended
to permit such use of collateral only in the "most extraordinary
circumstances."67 He said that the court should permit a turnover
of funds only if they could not be obtained on reasonable terms by
other means and only if it were shown by the clearest evidence that
it was highly likely that the debtor could be reorganized within a
reasonable time and that "the secured creditors whose security is
being compulsorily loaned will not be injured."6
A similar doctrine has been developed to deal with petitions
seeking the use of proceeds to make improvements and betterments
to property subject to a lien. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Kaplan," the court permitted use of cash collateral to prepare deteriorating inventory for sale, with the creditor's lien attaching to the
proceeds. 70 The court was influenced by the fact that the debts of
the bankrupt were well secured,7' that a fair, equitable and feasible
plan of reorganization had been filed in the court, 72 and that the
creditor would not be damaged by the action. 73 The test applied in
the Kaplan case was recently rearticulated by the Third Circuit in
Central Railroad Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 74 (the
Jersey Central case). The court contrasted the Third Ave. test for
permitting the use of collateral for operating expenses, which the
case actually involved, 75 with the test for expenditures adding to or
improving the capital of the debtor, which requires findings that

U

198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952).
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.

"

185 F.2d 791 (lst Cir. 1950).

66
67

70 Id. at 797-98; cf. Harding v. Stichman, 240 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1957).
71 185 F.2d at 793, 797.
72 Id.

at 793.

"Id. at 793-94.
- 421 F.2d 604 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949 (1970).
71 See id. at 606-07 & n.6. The expenditures were for removal of a damaged railroad
drawbridge that was ir danger of collapsing.
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"funds are presently needed and cannot be obtained elsewhere
S. , that reorganization is probably feasible, that the money...
expended for additions and betterments will materially contribute
to the possibility of successful reorganization . . . and that the interests of the bondholders are not thereby prejudiced." ' ,
The test for additions to capital stock is justifiably less restrictive than the test for expenditures for operating needs because additions to capital stock can continue to secure the creditors' claims.
For example, cash expended for improvement of a freight yard certainly makes the mortgage holders' security less liquid, but as long
as the value of their lien on the freight yard property exceeds the
indebtedness, plus interest, their fifth amendment property right is
protected. 7 Although both tests require a finding that secured creditors' rights are not prejudiced, the statement of the "additions or
betterments" test in Jersey Central includes within that requirement a determination that the property subject to lien will be worth
no less after the conversion than before. Under Third Ave., by contrast, there must be a firm prediction that the operating expenditure from existing capital will not bring the value of property subject
78
to lien below the amount of the secured creditors' claims.
These tests focus on the same elements that the Supreme Court
identified as significant in ContinentalBank: first, the essentiality
of the challenged action to a successful reorganization, and second,
the assurance that secured creditors' property rights will be respected. Taken together, ContinentalBank and the Third Ave. and
Jersey Central cases indicate that a creditor's foreclosure action
may be suspended and his security position diminished in the interest of reorganization, provided that the requirements of Radford and
Mountain Trust Bank are met. Although the Third Ave. and Jersey
Central tests depend, as does Mountain Trust Bank ,,7 upon the
court's judgment as to when an action will impair a secured creditor's lien, the rule remains that the liquidation value of the lien
must not be impaired.
"Id. at 606.
" See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 474 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Selkirk Yard" case).
7' See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974); cf. In re Boston & Maine Corp., 484 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1973) (the facts indicated
no threat to bondholders); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 474 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Selkirk
Yard" case); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 468 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Mortgage Release"
cases); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1972).
"' See text and notes at notes 51-56 supra.
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THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION

The New Haven Inclusion Cases,"0 decided by the Supreme

Court in 1970, contain language that recently has led the special
railroad reorganization court,"' and the Justice Department 2 to suggest that the rights of secured creditors in reorganization proceedings are not absolute. Several commentators have also understood
New Haven as endorsing the uncompensated impairment or sacrifice of a lien in reorganization proceedings if required in the public
interest.8 It will be argued here, however, that New Haven did not
change the law of creditors' rights in reorganization. A public interest formulation of creditors' rights would lead to results inconsistent
with the purposes of the reorganization statutes by creating legitimate claims for just compensation against the United States.
A. The Public Interest and New Haven: An Interpretation of
the Case
The ultimate issue in New Haven was the price the Penn Central Railroad was to pay for the assets of the bankrupt New Haven
Railroad upon its inclusion in the merged Pennsylvania-New York
Central System.84 Bondholders of the New Haven contended that
the lower court's order of payment of liquidation value as of December 31, 1966 would not compensate them for borrowing and deferments that had resulted in the accumulation of senior claims dating
from the inception of the proceedings in 1961,85 which by 1968
amounted to more than $70 million. 6 An unspecified portion of that
amount was attributable to priority claims accrued before income
reorganization was found to be impossible. But that impossibility
had become clear at least by December 31, 1963.7 Therefore, most
of the claims derived from operating losses incurred while there was
no prospect of income reorganization.
399 U.S. 392 (1970).
See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 922 (Spec. Ct. 1974), motion for
leave to file petition for writ of certiorariand/or mandamus and/orprohibition denied, 420
U.S. 922 (1975).
2 Brief for Appellants at 13, 27-28, Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102
(1974).
3 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 16 & n.9; YALE NoTE, supra note 18, at 1005, 1011-16.
11 399 U.S. at 399.
91Brief for New York N.H. & H.R.R. First Mortgage 4% Bondholders Committee, at
102-09.
11 399 U.S. at 490.
87 Id. at 460; Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Central R.R., 331 I.C.C. 643, 698
(1967).
"
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The Supreme Court conceded that the continued operation of
the railroad during the 1960's "greatly depressed the value of the
bondholders' interests," and that "the time consumed in the course
of the proceedings in the reorganization court" itself "imposed a
substantial loss upon the bondholders."8 8 But the Court went on to
say that "in the circumstances presented by this litigation we see
no constitutional bar to that result."89 Quoting from Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. ,1 the
Court noted that security holders "cannot be called upon to sacrifice
their property . . . . But they invested their capital in a public
utility that does owe an obligation to the public . . . [B]y their
entry into a railroad enterprise, [they] assumed the risk that in any
depression or reorganization the interests of the public would be
considered as well as theirs."'" Although this language suggests that
creditors' rights are not immutable in the face of a strong public
interest, the actual holding in New Haven, especially when viewed
in light of the secured creditors' previous acquiescence, indicates
that the fundamental rule has not changed.
In the Denver & Rio Grande case, whose language purportedly
creates a significant exception to the guarantee of full liquidation
value, the Court indicated only that the public interest "justifies
. . . requirements for reasonable maintenance and improvement of
the properties and for a capitalization with fair prospects for dividends on all classes of securities. 91 2 Junior bondholders were seeking
to reject a plan because investments undertaken out of current earnings during the trusteeship failed to add to the total valuation of the
railroad, while interest on senior claims continued to run, so that
the amount of compensation for their claims and their participation
in the reorganized enterprise were thereby reduced. 3 But they did
not contend that the liquidation value of their liens was impaired.
In upholding the bankruptcy court's power to override the rejection

"
"

399 U.S. at 490-91.
Id. at 491.
328 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1946).

399 U.S. at 491-92.
a 328 U.S. at 536.
"

Id. at 515.
Denver is not inconsistent with the Third Ave. and Jersey Central cases, which indicate that the constitutionally cognizable property right of a secured creditor in the liquidation
value of collateral securing a debt, up to the amount of the indebtedness, must be preserved
in the conduct of reorganization proceedings. At most, the Denver case may indicate that a
secured creditor does not have a comparable vested property right in any excess of value over
liquidation value that may accrue to him through reorganization, at least until the effective
date of the valuation and plan of reorganization.
"

"
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of the plan by the juniors when the plan had been found fair and
equitable as to them, the Court was careful to note that the bankruptcy power is "adequate to require creditors to acquiesce in a fair
adjustment of their claims, so long as the creditor gets all the value
of his lien and his share of any free assets." 5 So Denver itself reaffirmed the secured creditor's right to the full value of his lien and
limited the role of the public interest to justifying investments and
maintenance expenditures not impairing lien value. 8
In contrast to the situation in the Denver case where the railroad's earnings were increasing rapidly during the reorganization
proceedings, the New Haven railroad was being kept in operation
throughout the proceedings after it had been determined that
reorganization on an income basis was impossible.9 7 In fact, the
reorganization proceedings were continued primarily for the purpose
of allowing the negotiation of a sale of the New Haven assets in
bulk. Such a sale might have been perceived as potentially more
advantageous to New Haven creditors than an immediate liquidation sale; certainly, the fact that no bondholder petitioned the reorganization court to dismiss the proceedings in order to permit foreclosure until April 1967,11 over three years after reorganization possibilities had dwindled, supports this conclusion' 0 and may indicate the
bondholders' strategy.
13328 U.S.

at 533, citing Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940).
Besides quoting from the Denver case, the Court in New Haven quoted the following
language from the Penn Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1968): "[Plrivate
persons assume the risks attached to their investments," and "[wjhile the rights of the
bondholders are entitled to respect, they do not command Procrustean measures. . . .The
public interest is not merely a pawn to be sacrificed. . . ." 399 U.S. at 492.
In Penn Central, New Haven bondholders sought to hold up the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads because the two railroads had not agreed, and the
I.C.C. had not required them, to be responsible for all of the New Haven's losses in the period
before its eventual inclusion in the merged system. However, an interim package of financial
support from the Penn Central that would provide sufficient funds to keep the New Haven
running had been ordered by the I.C.C.
In these circumstances, the Court relied on the public interest in keeping the New Haven
operating to justify rejecting the bondholders' appeal. But the Court was careful to note that
the bondholders could litigate the terms of the New Haven inclusion in the reorganization
court or on appeal. 389 U.S. at 511. Thus, the case did not redefine the constitutionally
protected property rights of secured creditors. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d
270, 278, 281 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Central R.R., 331 I.C.C. 643, 698 (1967).
, Cf. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 408-418 (1970); In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 494 F.2d 270, 282 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
" 399 U.S. at 493 & n.83.
"0 Cf. Brief for Appellee New Haven Trustee at 87, Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 282 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
96
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Although the Court in New Haven denied the bondholders'
appeal for compensation from the Penn Central, it did not, as earlier
cases had not, 0' sanction a public interest exception to the right of
a secured creditor to the liquidation value of his lien. The bondholders failed to show that they had been coerced into permitting the
New Haven to continue in operation. 0 2 Even if they had been
coerced, it would seem that their claim would properly have been°3
against the United States rather than against the Penn Central.
But in any event, the Supreme Court was unable to award compensation because the bondholders had completely failed to show by
what amount, if any, their security position was eroded by the New
Haven's operating losses and the accumulation of senior claims.0 4
B. The Public Interest Rationale: Its Threat to Creditors'
Rights, and the Tucker Act
Despite the limits of the actual holding in the New Haven case,
the opinion's public interest language presents a significant threat
to the position of a creditor in corporate reorganization. Read out
of context, it seems to inject the public interest factor into the
definition of a creditor's essential property right. Thus, the Government argued in the Regional Rail ReorganizationAct Cases' that

"/t/he question whether involuntary continued loss operations result in a taking cannot be answered by reference to any bright line
test. The determination whether a taking has occurred in the course
of a railroad reorganization requires a complex balancing of the
competing public and private interests."'0 6 The special federal court
supervising reorganization of railroads in the northeast has gone
even further, saying that "[t/he key finding prerequisite to . . .
postponement of creditors' remedies is the likelihood of successful
reorganization."'0 7 This is clearly inconsistent with the constitu-

"',See text and notes at notes 91-96 supra.
'°2 399

U.S. at 493; cf. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 278, 282 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). But see YALE NoTE, supra note 18, at 1011 n.42, which
suggests that the Supreme Court could not have dismissed the bondholders' claim on this
ground, and that the Court must therefore have assumed a new constitutional standard,
because the ICC and the district court "encouraged the acquiescence."
103 Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
"1 399 U.S. at 492-93; Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Central R.R., 331 I.C.C.
643, 698 (1967); see note 28 supra.
'' 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
'" Brief for United States as Appellants at 17. The reply brief did not abandon this
position, see text at note 109 infra.
"I In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 919 (Spec. Ct. 1974), motion for leave
to file petition for writ of certiorariand/or mandamus and/or prohibition denied, 420 U.S.
922 (1975); see note 24 supra.
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tional protection of secured creditors' rights that Supreme Court
cases since Radford and ContinentalBank have recognized. The key
finding should be that liquidation value will not be denied to secured creditors.
An expanded role for the public interest factor in reorganization
court decisions respecting the security position of creditors may lead
to validation of judicial actions that have until now been considered
confiscatory.1 8 In its argument in the Rail Act cases, the Government contended that at least "for a reasonable time," pending substantial good faith efforts at rehabilitation, "the claimants against
a bankrupt railroad may constitutionally be compelled to bear the
burden of continuing its operations in the public interest." ' 9 This
construction of creditors' rights undercuts the property right of a
lienholder to the full liquidation value of the lien and is thus in
conflict with the rules enunciated in the major judicial decisions in
which the rights of creditors were defined. A constitutionally cognizable taking will occur if the value of the collateral falls below the
amount of the indebtedness it secures, no new collateral of equivalent value is substituted, and the value of the reorganized or liquidated corporation cannot compensate the creditor for the full liquidation value of his lien. '
Despite the interests that may arise in preserving the operations of certain corporate enterprises, such as interstate railroads,
bankruptcy reorganization courts must not overlook compelling
public policy reasons for permitting foreclosure and withdrawal of
capital when liquidation value would be impaired by further
delay.' Although it is beyond the scope of this comment to develop
fully the economic implications of undermining the property rights
of creditors by delaying or attenuating enforcement of security
contracts, in general the cost of borrowing would increase and the
See YALE NoTE, supra note 18, at 1008-16.
Reply Brief for United States as Appellants at 2. But cf. note 119 infra.
,,0
Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 528-29; cf. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 147 F.2d 40,
53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 884 (1945). But see In re Yale Express System, Inc., 384
F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967).
"I Several jurisprudential theories of the taking clause support the view that delay in
such circumstances would be confiscatory. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 195-98 (1974) (emphasizing protection of recognized economic interests); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. Rv. 63, 80; Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) (emphasizing protection of non-interfering
economic uses). It was argued in YALE NoTE, supra note 18, at 1018-21, that this theory
recognizes a secured creditor's right to withdraw capital from a bankrupt enterprise that
cannot operate profitably.
'0
'"
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availability of credit would be diminished for similar investments.' 12
The immediate effect of the changes would be to price certain marginal enterprises out of the credit market, perhaps even denying the
possibility to some salvageable enterprises the opportunity of arranging long-term debt obligations to bail themselves out of a current predicament-"' But the ultimate economic impact of the restriction of lien enforcement in corporate reorganizations, as one
writer has recently pointed out, "goes well beyond such marginal
cases. .

.

. While the contingency of nonenforcement will not affect

all potential borrowers equally, since the stronger would just have
to pay more for their credit, while the weaker would be denied credit
altogether, its effect on the cost of credit, and thereby upon economic growth, is undeniable."'1 These public policy implications
have not been totally lost on the judiciary. Justice Brandeis, for
example, supported his condemnation of the first Frazier-Lemke
Act, which applied only to pre-existing loan contracts, with the
observation that its drafters realized that prospective application
would wipe our farmers' future mortgage credit.1 '
Thus, the public interest rationale cannot, in view of the long
line of applicable Supreme Court decisions, render the uncompensated confiscation of a creditor's property interest constitutional.
And even if the precedent mandating the protection of full liquidation value did not preclude a reorganization court from allowing an
erosion in the value of the creditor's security that later goes uncompensated, the desirability of such a confiscation as a matter of public policy would be far from clear. In any case, the accommodation
of important public interests in both maintaining existing enterprises and fostering a useful market for secured credit should not be
undertaken by the reorganization courts on an ad hoc basis. The
reorganization statutes were designed to operate without public
subsidy." ' But if a court were to use the public interest rationale to
justify denying a secured creditor his foreclosure remedy, and liquidation value were irreparably lost, the creditor would have a claim
for compensation against the United States under the Tucker Act,
which vests jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to "render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded .
Constitution."117

upon the

,,I Cf. R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 55, 276 (1972).
"1 Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 516.
"'

Id.

,, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 595 & n.27 (1935).
" Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 537.
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 111, 1973); see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoumRs
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The availability of a remedy in the Court of Claims is certainly
desirable in light of the policy considerations supporting protection
of secured creditors and the fostering of a functional credit market.
In the Regional Rail ReorganizationAct Cases, the Supreme Court
approved this remedy for a taking under a special statute that in
this context is not distinguishable from chapter X or Section 77
reorganization procedures.' But Congress directly mandated the
continuation of specific railroad operations that threatened a taking
in the Rail Act cases, and weighed the public interest considerations
(including fiscal considerations) itself. A taking under chapter X or
section 77, on the other hand, would be ordered sua sponte by a
reorganization court after only its own view of the public interest
had been considered. If a reorganization court uses the Government's public interest interpretation of the New Haven case to impair the liquidation value of creditors' liens, those creditors would
be entitled to an award in the Court of Claims despite the fact that
the reorganization statutes are clearly intended to be selfsustaining."' Such judicial legislation should be avoided by strict
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1326-30, 1402 (1973); cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,

419 U.S. 102, 125-26 (1974).
Since, in connection with the federal power of eminent domain, the constitutional standard "for public use" has been construed as synonymous with a "for public advantage"
standard, 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 12, § 7.2[2], at 7-35, and any taking in aid of a
constitutional activity has been considered as being "for public use," id. § 7.31[2], at 7-74
and cases cited, a taking of property in a reorganization proceeding would probably be
considered "for public use," in view of the degree of public advantage in reorganizing distressed corporations. See 6 W. COLLIER, supra note 11, 0.01. See generally Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
A possible problem in relying on the Tucker Act remedy is that the ultimate judgment
of a bankruptcy reorganization court necessarily requires a finding that the plan is "fair and
equitable" as to all classes of creditors. See 6A W. COLLIER, supra note 11,
11.06. For this
reason, a creditor might be collaterally estopped from asserting a claim against the United
States because by definition there was no taking without compensation. See YALE NOTE,
supra note 18, at 1015 n.64. This obstacle would not exist, however, when the reorganization
proceeding fails and there is eventual liquidation. In addition, the mutuality of estoppel
doctrine is not dead in the federal courts, and the United States would not, in the usual case,
have been a party in the reorganization proceeding itself. Therefore, the Treasury is not
clearly immune from Tucker Act claims. See 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.44112],
0.441[3] (2d ed. 1974); cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971).
118The Court found that Congress had not intentionally withdrawn the Tucker Act
remedy that otherwise appeared fully applicable and construed the Rail Act, which was at
best ambiguous as to the Tucker Act, so as to avoid holding it unconstitutional in authorizing
uncompensated takings. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27, 134
(1974). See also In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 942 (Spec. Ct. 1974), motion
for leave to file petition for writ of certiorariand/or mandamus and/orprohibition denied,
420 U.S. 922 (1975).
"I In its opening brief in the Rail Act cases, the Government argued that the Act was
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adherence to the tests developed in the courts to preserve liquidation value of secured creditors' liens during reorganization proceed20
ings.'
CONCLUSION

Although the remedial rights of a secured creditor can be regulated in the interest of accomplishing successful corporate reorganizations, such regulation violates the fifth amendment of the Constitution when it impairs the liquidation value of the creditor's lien
without compensation. This fundamental principle stems simply
from the Supreme Court's definition of the secured creditor's property interest and the fifth amendment's prohibition against uncompensated confiscation of property for the public use. The public
interest exception that has been drawn from the language of the
New Haven Inclusion Cases can certainly never justify the taking
of property without compensation. But to the extent that the
Tucker Act is relied upon to supply that compensation in confiscatory chapter X or section 77 reorganizations, the design of the
general corporate reorganization scheme is undercut and the function of the Congress in weighing conflicting public interests is
usurped. This comment has argued that the reorganization courts
instead must respect the absolute property rights of secured creditors and must not employ the public interest rationale to allow the
liquidation value of their liens to be diluted during reorganization
proceedings.
Martin D. Jacobson
constitutional regardless of the availability of the Tucker Act remedy, but that position was
qualified in the reply brief. 419 U.S. at 123. At oral argument the Solicitor General conceded
that availability of the Tucker Act remedy was essential to constitutionality. Letter from
Robert H. Bork, Solicitor General, to Professor Edmund W. Kitch, The University of Chicago
Law School, March 13, 1975, on file in the office of The University of Chicago Law Review.
,,0 One commentator has suggested that the public interest should require that secured
creditors' claims be given up in the interest of reorganization and proposes that a tax credit
be given to the creditor as compensation. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 542. This suggestion
would require legislation, forcing Congress to weigh the value of reorganized enterprises
generally against the needs of the public treasury. Congress might well decide that some
businesses should fail because they are not economically viable; failure of such businesses has
a positive effect on the economy as a whole because other, healthier businesses will be
established to take their place, using resources more efficiently. Congress has in fact made
these choices on an individual basis (witness the Lockheed Aircraft and Penn Central subsidies and the decision not to subsidize Pan American Airlines), and may want to reserve the
public interest choice for itself rather than delegating it to the reorganization courts.

